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Timor-Leste’s Foreign Policy: Securing 
State Identity in the Post-Independence 
Period
Selver B. Sahin  
Abstract: This paper examines some of the major ideational aspects of 
Timor-Leste’s foreign policy orientation in the post-independence period. 
Drawing upon the constructivist accounts of state behaviour, the paper 
situates Timorese leaders’ foreign policy decisions in the broader context of 
their search to position the fledging nation in the global political order. It 
argues that Timor-Leste’s insecure state identity has shaped its leaders’ for-
eign policy preferences in the post-independence period. This identity can be 
examined by separating it into two parts: the construction of spatial bounda-
ries and the creation of a temporal “other”. The former is evidenced by the 
leadership’s rhetorical emphasis on the country’s Portuguese heritage and 
their prioritisation of ASEAN membership, both of which are closely related 
to the consolidation of the young nation’s political and cultural identity. The 
creation of a temporal other, as illustrated by the rise of political discourse 
emphasising sovereignty, reflects a wider transitional process that is embed-
ded in the country’s transformation from colony to independent state under 
international supervision as well as the state’s transformation from “fragile” 
or “failing” to “stable”. A detailed analysis of the basic aspects of Timor-
Leste’s insecurities as a constitutive element of its foreign policy becomes 
instrumental to understanding the country’s nation-state-building experience 
since its separation from Indonesia in 1999, as it enters a new phase of so-
cio-political structuring following the withdrawal of the international security 
presence in 2012.  
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Introduction
Timor-Leste,1 one of the youngest members of the community of states, 
has entered a new stage of nation-state-building following the withdrawal 
of the United Nations presence in December 2012. It is possible to de-
fine nation-state-building as two separate but interrelated processes of 
political and social transformation that are shaped by the particular deci-
sions and actions taken by national political leaderships, such as their 
choice of governance models, what development policies they adopt, and 
the way they formulate strategic approaches towards memberships in 
regional and global organisations. Nation-state-building, in other words, 
entails not only the pursuit of institutional and socio-economic devel-
opment objectives but also the construction and consolidation of a sov-
ereign state identity that is recognised and respected by other states. 
Viewed as such, the UN’s withdrawal thirteen years after the territory’s 
separation from Indonesia signifies a turning point in this process of 
socio-political structuring. It is equally worthwhile to note that Timorese 
leaders, as a result of a growing political experience and increasing wealth 
from oil and gas over the past few years, have indeed felt more confident 
in their capacity to lead the fledging nation’s path to socio-economic 
development as well as to secure its position in the regional and global 
order (Sahin 2012). 
While the relationship between foreign and domestic politics is rec-
ognised in the bourgeoning case-study literature on the Timorese nation-
building process, the specific interconnections between the two have 
received little attention (for a discussion of Timor-Leste’s foreign policy 
orientation, see, for example, Sukma 2001; Smith 2005). This paper at-
tempts to bridge this analytical gap by drawing upon constructivist ac-
counts of state action, which describe the foreign policy preferences of 
state officials as a continuous engagement with securing national identity. 
The paper locates the analysis of Timor-Leste’s foreign policy-making in 
the broader context of Timorese decision-makers’ quest to position their 
young state in the emerging global order based on their conceptions of 
“self” and “others”. It argues that Timor-Leste’s insecure state identity 
1  Depending on the time period of the events discussed in the paper, I use the 
terms “Timor-Leste” and “East Timor” to refer to the eastern half of the island 
of Timor along with the islands of Atauro, off the northern coast, and Jaco, to 
the northeast, which together constitute the territory of what is now officially 
known as the República Democrática de Timor-Leste. “East Timor” will be 
used when events preceding independence are addressed, “Timor-Leste” for 
the period following the formal achievement of independence in May 2002.  
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has determined the parameters of the political leadership’s foreign policy 
moves. This identity can be examined by breaking it down into two parts: 
the construction of spatial boundaries and the creation of a temporal 
“other”. The former refers to the Timorese state’s political and cultural 
distinction from its neighbours. The latter relates to a wider process that 
encompasses the country’s transition from a colony to an independent 
state under international supervision as well as its transformation from a 
“fragile” or “failing” state to a more stable one. These conceptions of 
identity have driven the Timorese political leadership’s foreign policy 
decisions. 
It should be noted, however, that this distinction is made for analy-
tical rather than practical purposes, as there is some overlap between the 
two, as discussed later in the article. Examining the formation of concep-
tions of East Timorese identity by reference to domestic and external 
processes of interactive policy-making provides a useful analytical frame-
work because policy-makers do not approach the international arena 
with a “blank slate” but with their own thoughts about the world and the 
place of their state in it (Weldes 1996). The point is to clarify “what is on 
that slate that decision-makers are bringing with them in their interaction 
with external Others” (Hopf 2002: 290).  
The objective of this paper, therefore, is to explore the ideational 
foundations of Timor-Leste’s foreign policy-making by way of analysing 
the writings and speeches of prominent state actors on particular foreign 
policy issues.2 In doing so, the paper examines in detail how the spatial 
and temporal dynamics of Timor-Leste’s insecure identity have shaped 
the political leadership’s foreign policy choices in the post-independence 
period. An in-depth analysis of the basic aspects of Timor-Leste’s inse-
cure identity as a constitutive element of its foreign policy is crucial to 
explaining the country’s political transformation since its separation from 
Indonesia in 1999, as it enters a new phase of nation-state-building and 
its relations with its “traditional allies” and other external partners, par-
ticularly China, are closely scrutinised. As an important point to note in 
this regard, the use of the written or verbal statements of Timorese state 
officials as an analytical tool does not necessarily mean that the author 
takes these at face value. It rather serves to exemplify their “representa-
tional practices” (Campbell 1998; Weldes 1996) in relation to the 
2  Some of the key actors whose ideas and interpretations of the domestic and 
regional affairs have influenced the country’s foreign policy agenda that is ad-
dressed in this paper include incumbent Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, for-
mer President José Ramos-Horta, current Minister of Justice Dionisio Babo-
Soares and Helder da Costa, the coordinator of the g7+Secretariat. 
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(re)construction of the East Timorese state identity, which, as the con-
structivist theory of international politics asserts, is an insecure entity in 
essence.  
The paper begins with a brief conceptual overview of foreign poli-
cy-making as an instrument of securing state identity. A detailed analysis 
of the spatial aspects of the Timorese leadership’s foreign policy choices 
is provided in the next section. The final part explores the temporal 
aspects of these preferences as a reflection of an insecure identity. 
Conceptualising Foreign Policy as a Practice of 
Securing Identity 
Foreign policy analyses, informed by classical realism and neorealism, 
have largely focused on the ways in which states seek to satisfy their 
material interests, which are defined in terms of power. The former lo-
cates the origins of power politics in the self-interested nature of human 
behaviour (Morgenthau 1978). The latter explains the foreign policy 
decisions that states make in relation to the distribution of power in an 
anarchic world system that renders conflict an ever-present possibility 
(Waltz 1979). These analytical approaches take the properties of states as 
intrinsic and they rest on the rational actor model to predict or explain 
foreign policy practices of states as a set of fixed responses to specific 
security threats (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996). 
However, when viewed from a constructivist perspective, states do 
not simply face threats and act on the basis of predetermined, objective 
factors such as the relative distribution of power in an anarchic envi-
ronment. Rather, states are actively involved in the construction of their 
own national interests through processes of interpretation and represen-
tation (Weldes 1996). The distribution of power, Wendt (1992: 391–425) 
argues, may always affect state officials’ calculations, but the way it does 
so depends on “intersubjective understandings” that shape their concep-
tions of self and other. States, therefore, “do not have a ‘portfolio’ of 
interests that they carry around independent of social context” (Wendt 
1992: 398). It is rather the interactive processes of creating meaning or 
defining situations that determine their interests (Wendt 1992). These 
meanings are essentially those produced by state officials in relation to 
both international (Wendt 1999) and domestic historical and political 
contexts (Weldes 1996). Here, “interaction” is not simply the exchange 
of views or words by two actors, such as at an international meeting, but 
the relationship between the set of knowledge that each actor has of the 
other that determines the constitution of identity (Hopf 2002). Viewed 
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as such, foreign policy choices that state officials make to define certain 
issues as threats or as circumstances calling for a particular action can be 
best understood as “interpretive processes” that are shaped by interests, 
which in turn “depend on a particular construction of self-identity in 
relation to the conceived identity of others” (Jepperson, Wendt, and 
Katzenstein 1996: 60). Identities, in other words, provide the basis for 
interests because actors “cannot decide what their interests are until they 
know what they are representing – ‘who they are’”, which is also consti-
tuted in and by processes of social relationships (Jepperson, Wendt, and 
Katzenstein 1996: 60). 
However, identities are “not fixed by nature” but “performatively” 
constituted through representational practices of differentiation that 
distinguish a “self” from an “other” (Campbell 1998). The construction 
of identities in relation to others performs “three necessary functions”: 
“It tells you and others who you are, tells you who others are, and im-
plies a set of interests with respect to the choice of particular actions” 
(Hopf 1998: 175). The establishment of identity in relation to difference, 
however, potentially embodies a tension or “the paradox of difference” 
that complicates the constitutive relationship between self and other 
(Connolly 2002). This is not to suggest that differentiation of one group 
from another automatically results in strategies of otherness or violence, 
but the potential always exists due to the role of difference in the logic of 
identity as something both constituting and threatening its existence 
(Campbell 1998). Because of this paradox inherent to its capacity to exist 
as a state, the identity of the state is always an “insecure” (Connolly 2002) 
or “precarious” (Weldes 1999) entity that “needs constantly to be stabil-
ized or (re)produced” (Weldes 1999: 59). In other words, the boundaries 
– which distinguish a “self” from an “other”, an “inside” from an “out-
side”, and “domestic” from “foreign” – need to be re-inscribed when 
distinction becomes “ambiguous” (Campbell 1998: 8, 69–72, 126). 
Observed this way, foreign policy appears to be one of these 
boundary-creating practices that helps produce and reproduce the identi-
ty of the state in whose name it operates (Campbell 1998: 75). Because 
the conception of “what ‘we’ are” is closely linked to an understanding 
of “what ‘we’ fear” (Campbell 1998: 85), the operation of discourses of 
fear and danger becomes central to the process of securing identity, 
which demands its protection from a “spatial” (Campbell 1998: 69–70) 
or “temporal” (Wæver 1998) other. In this sense, foreign policy practices 
which impose boundaries and create meaning often construct an external 
realm that is inferior and threatening (Campbell 1998: 69–71). The ex-
ternalisation of threats reinforces the distinction between an orderly 
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inside and a chaotic outside, which, as noted above, helps secure the 
state’s existence. The location of threats in the outside realm also helps 
discipline the domestic realm by defining and representing resistant ele-
ments as “foreign” and linking them to threats located on the outside 
(Campbell 1998: 69–71). States’ management of their day-to-day rela-
tions with each other, in other words, entails the characterisation of 
certain events or actors as “foreign” in order to secure their identity. The 
construction of the “foreign”, however, is not restricted solely to subjec-
tive interpretations and linguistic practices of state officials but refers to 
an intersubjectively constituted process, as the construction of national 
interests involves the “interpellation” of individuals into the particular 
representations of world politics or their identification with a particular 
subject position or identity produced in and through these representa-
tions (Weldes 1996). It is important to note in this context that “identifi-
cation” does not refer to the explicit or implicit approval of such repre-
sentations by the masses, but, instead, denotes the emergence of a situa-
tion whereby the perception of particular power relations and interests is 
naturalised as “the way the world really is”, while alternative understand-
ings of events and courses of action are marginalised (Weldes 1996). 
The Definition of Timor-Leste’s Regional
Affiliations as a Practice of Spatial Boundary-
Setting
Timor-Leste’s path to independence began in June 1998, when the 
Habibie government proposed special autonomy status for East Timor. 
Later, in January 1999, the Indonesian president somewhat unexpectedly 
agreed to the conduct of a UN-sponsored popular consultation, which 
enabled the people of East Timor to choose between autonomy and full 
independence. The vote was held on 30 August 1999 and the majority of 
the registered electorate (78.5 per cent) opted for independence. How-
ever, the violence orchestrated by pro-autonomy militias following the 
announcement of the results by the UN led to the deaths of hundreds of 
people, a near-total destruction of the physical infrastructure and the 
displacement of almost two-thirds of the population. This wave of vio-
lence prompted the deployment of an Australian-led multinational force, 
the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), to restore law and 
order, and the subsequent establishment of a large UN state-building 
mission, known as the United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET). The UN mission was vested with all sovereign 
 Timor-Leste’s Foreign Policy 9 
powers to prepare the territory for political independence and construct 
democratic state institutions. UNTAET handed over administrative au-
thority to the elected Timorese government at a public ceremony on 20 
May 2002, which was also attended by President Megawati Sukarnoputri 
of Indonesia. The UN maintained its presence through a smaller support 
mission, which was mandated to provide interim law enforcement and 
assist with the operational readiness of the Timorese police service.  
Timor-Leste’s path to political independence, which followed cen-
turies of foreign rule, also marked the beginning of another challenging 
process: nation-state-building. The building of the East Timorese nation-
state entailed, among other things, improving the effectiveness of its 
newly created state institutions and consolidating its political identity 
(Sahin 2011). After all, the capacity of states to maintain their existence 
as a cohesive territorial entity, as Campbell rightly points out, becomes 
possible “only by virtue of their ability to constitute themselves as imag-
ined communities” (Campbell 1998: 195). In the case of Timor-Leste, 
the resolution of two important issues occupied a central place in the 
production of the boundaries of the identity of the newly established 
state: One was the choice of the country’s main languages, which became 
a divisive topic as the promotion of Portuguese alienated the country’s 
youth, who felt excluded from the post-independence nation-state-
building process dominated by Timorese leaders of older generations 
(Nurbaiti 2001). The re-institution of the former coloniser’s language as 
one of the two official languages of the state more than two decades 
after Portugal’s departure was a political decision (Sahin 2011). It was 
influenced by both material and non-material factors. The adoption of 
Portuguese advantaged a historically privileged class and provided the 
Timorese government with access to European Union funds for national 
development through Portugal (Sahin 2011).  
It was also a way for the older-generation Timorese leaders, whose 
political authority was challenged by Indonesian-educated younger 
Timorese in the post-Indonesian period, to “discipline the inside”. They 
managed to contain the internal opposition to Portuguese by arguing 
that it was an “integral” component of East Timorese national identity, 
while emphasising the foreignness of Indonesian. This belief is reflected 
in Xanana Gusmão’s rationalisation of the choice of Portuguese. Ac-
cording to Gusmão, former guerrilla leader and now Prime Minister, his 
country owed its independence to Portugal: “If the Portuguese [had] left 
many years ago”, the Timorese leader argued, “the Dutch would have 
taken this area and we would have become Indonesia. We have them to 
thank for our own identity” (quoted in Greenlees and Garran 2002: 312). 
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The choice of Portuguese and development of “privileged ties” with 
Portuguese-speaking countries were incorporated into the Constitution 
adopted in March 2002. Thus, the adoption of Portuguese served to 
produce the boundaries of the identity of the state as Portuguese sym-
bolises Timor-Leste’s political independence and cultural difference from 
its two powerful neighbours, Indonesia and Australia. The description of 
the newly born state’s identity in terms of an inherited Portuguese identi-
ty, in other words, has been instrumental to the production of the state’s 
political and cultural boundaries, providing the basis for its interests. For 
reasons outlined above, it was promoted to the population in Timor-
Leste as being in the interests of the newly independent nation.  
The other key component of Timor-Leste’s identity formation was 
related to the resolution of a “regional dilemma” that was also rooted in 
a historical context (Babo-Soares and da Costa 2003). José Ramos-Horta, 
who would later become the first Foreign Minister of the East Timorese 
state, describes the historical and cultural origins of this dilemma as fol-
lows in 1996, when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize:  
East Timor is at the crossroads of three major cultures: Melanes-
ian, which binds us to our brothers and sisters of the South Pacific 
region; Malay-Polynesian, binding us to Southeast Asia; and the 
Latin Catholic influence, a legacy of almost 500 years of Portu-
guese colonization (Nobelprize.org 1996). 
Throughout the Indonesian occupation, the nationalist political leader-
ship organised in the diaspora promoted closer ties with Melanesian 
states, which strongly supported Timor-Leste’s struggle for independ-
ence in the international arena. For instance, Ramos-Horta stated in 
March 1999 that East Timorese had “more in common culturally and 
historically with the South Pacific than with Indonesia and the rest of 
Southeast Asia” (Pasifik Nius 1999). After independence, however, 
Timorese politicians chose to assert the newly born state’s identity as a 
Southeast Asian nation by joining the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Regarding that choice, Ramos-Horta, who had as-
sumed the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the transitional 
cabinet formed by UNTAET, remarked in an interview in 2001,  
Ideally, we’d prefer membership in both ASEAN and the Pacific 
Islands Forum. However, ASEAN rules do not permit such dou-
ble membership. We are taking one step at a time, developing bi-
lateral relations with as many ASEAN countries as possible, pav-
ing the way for a future application for full membership (Asia 
pacificms.com 2001). 
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While it might be possible to trace the origins of Timorese policy-makers’ 
policy of positioning their state in Southeast Asia back to 1975,3 it is 
important to note that Ramos-Horta’s statement followed the comments 
of an Indonesian diplomat, who argued that Timor-Leste “cannot be 
accepted as a member of ASEAN if it also wants to be a member of the 
South Pacific Forum” (Timor Post 2001). Babo-Soares and da Costa (2003) 
explain the leadership’s shifting position as fitting a “logic” of policy and 
economic interest by gaining access to an influential regional grouping, 
broadening the newly created state’s regional ties beyond Indonesia and 
connecting it commercially to strong economies. According to Ramos-
Horta, though, joining the bloc would be important for Timor-Leste’s 
future “not so much as an economic umbrella […] but as a means to 
attain security” (Ramos-Horta 2001: 8). 
Ramos-Horta’s description of ASEAN membership as a security 
project exemplifies the constructivist views of identities as being the 
basis of interests. By choosing ASEAN rather than the Pacific Island 
Forum – made up of small island states and dominated by Australia and 
New Zealand – Timorese decision-makers indicated their interest in 
becoming a part of a bigger and seemingly more flexible and stable re-
gional grouping. Ramos-Horta’s remarks also illustrate how foreign poli-
cy decisions are made through intersubjectively constituted processes – 
that is, state officials do not have a predetermined “portfolio” of inter-
ests; rather, their calculations are shaped by “intersubjective understand-
ings” of “self” and “other” (Wendt 1999) that are rooted in historical 
contexts (Weldes 1996). The realisation of the “self”, as noted earlier, is 
closely linked to an understanding of “what ‘we’ fear” (Campbell 1998). 
In the case of Timor-Leste, which finally became independent in 2002 
following four centuries of Portuguese colonial administration, 24 years 
of Indonesian occupation and two-and-a-half years of UN transitional 
rule, foreign interference constitutes a particular source of fear. Timorese 
politicians’ choice of Southeast Asia, in other words, relates to their 
search for the identity of the new state vis-à-vis its two powerful neigh-
3  In a press statement issued on 16 September 1975, FRETILIN (Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent Timor-Leste) recognises ASEAN as “a factor of sta-
bility and a driving force of regional cooperation. East Timor would greatly 
benefit from integration into ASEAN after independence.” However, Cold 
War politics diminished the left-wing party’s efforts to prevent the Indonesian 
occupation and led to the eventual exclusion of the former Portuguese colony 
as a “legitimate political actor” from the agenda of ASEAN, which had already 
declared its own “anti-communist character”. For further details, see Ortuoste 
(2011).  
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bours. By expressing their willingness to cooperate with Indonesia in a 
regional organisation that promotes the norms of non-intervention and 
prevention of great power rivalry in the region, Timorese policy-makers 
sought to assure Jakarta that Timor-Leste would not become a “Trojan 
horse” for an external power (Smith 2005). This assurance became par-
ticularly important considering one of the arguments Indonesia had put 
forward in the past to justify its annexation of East Timor: to prevent the 
former Portuguese colony from becoming an unviable state vulnerable 
to intervention by bigger states (Smith 2005; see also Anderson 1995). 
In March 2011, with a view to finalising the country’s almost dec-
ade-long ASEAN bid, whose significance goes beyond economic bene-
fits to the realm of identity formation, the Timorese government official-
ly applied to become the eleventh member of the regional bloc “as soon 
as possible”. Despite Jakarta’s strong backing, the required consensus 
among member states could not be achieved – reportedly due to Singa-
pore’s objection to the admission of as poor and still institutionally weak 
state as Timor-Leste – while ASEAN’s economic integration process is 
still underway (Wain 2011). According to some observers, China’s grow-
ing ties with its former province underlie Jakarta’s “unconditional” sup-
port for Timorese accession, even though the Indonesian government 
rejects the parallels established between the cases of Timor-Leste and 
Myanmar (Chongkittavorn 2011). 
However, it should be noted that Myanmar’s admission to the re-
gional grouping in 1997 on a fast-track basis was a political decision 
intended to marginalise the Chinese presence in Southeast Asia. Political 
developments since then indicate the contrary, though. Indeed, through 
its soft-power diplomacy based on a no-strings-attached approach, Bei-
jing has come to be viewed by the regional states, including Timor-Leste, 
as an alternative source of development aid. In addition to the provision 
of training and scholarships for East Timorese students and civil serv-
ants, China has provided funding for the construction of a new presiden-
tial palace, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and defence buildings and 
military residential quarters in Dili. China also sold two patrol boats to 
Timor-Leste in 2010. 
These developments, particularly the purchase of the boats, were al-
so closely watched by Australia. Dili’s rejection of Canberra’s offer for 
Timor-Leste to join the Australian Pacific Patrol Boat Program in favour 
of purchasing the two Shanghai-class vessels, including their operation 
by Chinese sailors until the Timorese crews were trained, raised ques-
tions in the Australian media as to whether their neighbour was shifting 
its strategic orientation (see, for example, Toohey 2010). Writing on the 
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matter in a report released by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
(ASPI) in April 2011, Dionisio Babo-Soares (2011: 295), secretary-
general of Xanana Gusmão’s CNRT (National Congress for the Recon-
struction of Timor-Leste) party, emphasised that the government’s pur-
chase of the boats and receipt of Chinese aid “doesn’t mean that Timor-
Leste is leaving its traditional allies”. 
When looked at from the perspective of the constructivist theory of 
state action, it becomes abundantly clear that the Gusmão government’s 
move to increase bilateral cooperation with China reflects Timorese 
leaders’ growing confidence and political experience in manoeuvring 
between competing state actors to secure the identity of their fledging 
state as the basis of national interest. First, it should be noted that the 
Timorese government’s foreign policy move followed a serious dispute 
with the Australian-based oil company Woodside, which is in favour of 
building a floating platform in the Timor Sea to process gas in the 
Greater Sunrise fields. Timorese leaders, however, have insisted on the 
construction of an onshore pipeline with a view to linking the gas re-
serves to the country’s pressing energy and socio-economic needs, in-
cluding the creation of employment opportunities for the youth. Second, 
Indonesian and Australian concerns over China’s increasing regional 
influence are not unknown to Timorese state officials. The Rudd gov-
ernment’s 2009 Defence White Paper, for instance, states that  
the pace, scope and structure of China’s military modernisation 
have the potential to give its neighbours cause for concern if not 
carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to 
build confidence regarding its military plans (Australia’s Depart-
ment of Defence 2009).  
By increasing Dili’s ties with Beijing, the Timorese government, as one 
foreign observer rightly points out, seeks to demonstrate they have other 
options “when it comes to defence partners” (quoted in Murdoch 2011) 
and when it comes to the availability of overseas development resources. 
In so doing, Timorese leaders seek to improve their country’s competi-
tive position in their dealings with Jakarta and Canberra, which both 
declared their full support for Dili’s entry into ASEAN.  
Timor-Leste’s relations with China, in other words, are linked to 
both material and ideational considerations. On one hand, Timorese 
leaders are trying to avoid being heavily dependent on their country’s 
two powerful neighbours. On the other hand, their development of 
closer relations with China is driven by a desire to consolidate an “inde-
pendent” state identity. These material and non-material factors are 
linked to each other. Dili’s ties with Beijing not only affect boundary-
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setting aspects of Timor-Leste’s identity, but also are closely related to 
their need for a temporal other. As will be discussed in the following 
section, Timor-Leste’s identity is “performatively” constituted in relation 
to the “fragile” or “failing” state status and the importance of the “inter-
subjective understandings” of that status: As Timorese officials seek to 
define their country’s spatial boundaries and independent identity by 
promoting closer relations with China, other countries such as Australia 
and Indonesia are concerned with Beijing’s expanding influence over the 
South Pacific region. Furthermore, these countries may view Timor-
Leste’s externally perceived status as a “fragile” state as particularly prob-
lematic. Clearly, Timor-Leste needs to secure more aid for its socio-
economic development. To that end, it is trying to access resources be-
ing offered by China to developing states unconditionally. Thus, Austral-
ia and Indonesia are likely to prefer a Timorese state that becomes more 
stable in the sense of Weberian statehood and aligns itself with ASEAN 
rather than with China. 
The “Failed State” Image as Timor-Leste’s 
Temporal Other 
Timor-Leste was largely viewed as a poster child for internationally as-
sisted democratic state-building until the outbreak of a security crisis in 
2006 (Sahin 2007). The eruption of violent riots in the streets of Dili, 
including deadly clashes between the military and the police in May 2006 
exposed how deeply political rivalries and social tensions permeated the 
institutional aspects of the nation-building process. The riots cost the 
lives of at least 37 people and led to the displacement of approximately 
150,000 people in the capital (United Nations 2006a). The UN respond-
ed to the crisis by deploying its fifth mission since 1999, which was 
mandated to provide public safety, to “assist” the Timorese government 
in promoting national recovery and to conduct a comprehensive review 
of the needs and responsibilities of the security sector (United Nations 
2006b). The 2006 crisis changed the country’s image from one of a suc-
cessfully developing state to a “failed state”. For instance, since 2007 it 
has been listed among the most vulnerable states in Failed States Index 
put out by Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace (Fund for Peace 2013). 
Former President Ramos-Horta’s statement before the UN Security 
Council in February 2007 illustrates the political leadership’s disap-
pointment by the ambivalent treatment of the identity of the Timorese 
state by the international community: 
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Some in the past have been overly optimistic, but that can lead 
people to lose perspective, to lose sight of reality and turn pessi-
mistic at the first sight of trouble. One day they label East Timor a 
success story, the next day they call it a failure (United Nations 
2007). 
It is here that a brief discussion of “failed state” status as a discourse and 
act of boundary-setting becomes instrumental to understand Timorese 
politicians’ foreign policy discourses. The concept of “failed state” origi-
nated in the early 1990s. Helman and Ratner were among the first to use 
the concept in the context of the breakdown of central authority struc-
tures and the eruption of violence in countries like Somalia and former 
Yugoslav and Soviet republics following the fall of socialist regimes 
(Helman and Ratner 1992). While it was treated as a regional security and 
humanitarian problem during that period, the “state failure” issue be-
came a central concern for Western policy-makers following the attacks 
of 11 September 2001. The expanding policy and academic literature is 
characterised by an abundance of terms used to describe the phenome-
non, but it is informed by an analytical methodology that seeks to meas-
ure the institutional and functional capacities of states. Although the 
term “fragile” states is now widely used by the World Bank and bilateral 
development agencies such as the UK’s Department for International 
Development, the phenomenon is still analysed in terms of a continuum 
of “stateness”, along which the world’s states are ranked according to 
their performance in meeting the Weberian criteria for statehood (Milli-
ken and Krause 2002; Bilgin and Morton 2004). Due to their limited 
institutional ability to exercise territorial control and provide for the 
needs of their citizens, these states are also associated with a series of 
global security challenges, such as human trafficking, pandemics, crimi-
nal networks and terrorism (Fukuyama 2004). It is therefore argued on 
an international level that it is too risky to leave these states to their own 
devices, and that these states should instead be responded to with capaci-
ty-building interventions. The ability or willingness of the political lead-
erships of these “failed” states to engage in international capacity-build-
ing frameworks determines the type of intervention, ranging from forced 
regime change and peacekeeping to the establishment of UN trustee-
ships and the insertion of foreign advisory staff into key state institutions 
(Torres and Anderson 2004; Francois and Sud 2006).  
One of the main criticisms of the “failed state” paradigm is the 
presentation of some states’ experience as a “deviation” from the “ideal”, 
which is constructed by reference to the performance of those states 
viewed as approximating it most (Bilgin and Morton 2004; Hameiri 
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2007). This approach, according to Wilde, helps reinforce Western ideas 
of a “successful” self constituted in relation to a “failed” other, resonat-
ing Edward Said’s conceptualisation of Orientalism “as a way of under-
standing how Western culture conceives itself through an alienated, ori-
ental ‘other’” (Wilde 2004: 91). Another often criticised aspect of the 
“state failure” paradigm is its disregard for the underlying historical con-
text out of which different forms of state organisation have come into 
existence in different parts of the world (Milliken and Krause 2002; 
Bilgin and Morton 2004). In addition, much has been written on how 
“failed state” status has been exploited to operationalise military inter-
vention against certain regimes (Boas and Jennings 2007: 475–485). 
However, the question of how those states – labelled as “fragile”, “failing” 
or “failed” – have responded to this paradigm has received little 
analytical attention. Even the most ardent critics of the mainstream 
literature (such as Chandler 2006) have tended to treat these states as 
passive receivers of the discourse and confined their analyses to the ways 
in which Western powers have constructed the identity of some non-
Western societies as “failed states” and rationalised their intrusive policy 
interventions.  
However, following Wendt’s (1992) conceptualisation of actors’ 
construction of identities as an outcome of intersubjectively constituted 
processes rather than a one-way relationship, it can be argued that the 
leaderships of those countries framed as “fragile” or “failed states” may 
resist such representations even within the terms of the dominant 
discourse. Resistance by local elites, as Bhabha (1994) points out in his 
analysis of colonial discourses, can take shape through adopting or 
adapting the concepts and practices that powerful external agencies 
construct on the basis of difference. Through “mimicking” the language 
of the dominant actors in the international arena, local elites struggle 
against hegemonic structures and ideologies because “mimicry”, Bhabha 
suggests, reflects “the desire for a reformed, recognizable ‘Other’, as a 
subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite” (Bhabha 
1994: 122). 
When this analytical approach is applied to Timor-Leste, where the 
UN and other international agencies were heavily involved in the 
creation of democratic state capacities, it appears that the “failed state” 
concept has become the basis for a temporal other, against which the 
identity of the Timorese state has been “performatively” constituted. 
The “failed state” discourse, as discussed earlier, produces a “paradox of 
difference” as it presents the differences in the governance capacity of 
states as a global security problem and makes them appear an aberration 
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from the norm. Moreover, the willingness of their leaderships to enter 
into partnerships for the purpose of capacity development determines 
the course of international action to address the security implications of 
“state failure”. In this regard, the possibility of the use of foreign military 
or political power creates enormous pressure for many developing states. 
On the other hand, international actors’ favouring of “good performers” 
(Harrison 2001; Harrison and Mulley 2007) or “good enough performers” 
(Grindle 2004; DFID 2005) in strengthening state capacity provides 
opportunities to the state with regard to the availability of development 
assistance. In an attempt to access aid and avoid direct or indirect forms 
of intervention and regulation, the leaders of developing states are often 
likely to adopt or express their commitment to the forms and values of 
governance structures promoted by international agencies.  
This is exemplified by Timorese politicians’ verbal references to 
some of the key elements of the contemporary development discourse in 
an attempt to distinguish the identity of their state, a state that is 
committed to democratic ideals and willing to share its development 
experience with other countries. For instance, the strengthening of 
liberal democratic principles is described in the above-mentioned ASPI 
report as being within the “core national interest” of the Timorese state 
(Babo-Soares 2011: 21). Prime Minister Gusmão’s speech before the 
British donor community in London in March 2011 is another case in 
point to demonstrate the centrality of internationally advocated concepts 
(for instance, the security–development nexus, lesson-learning and 
eradicating the root causes of conflict) to the government’s development 
discourse:  
From these crises [in 2006 and 2008] we learnt that the path to 
development is difficult […]. And most importantly, we learnt that 
we needed to directly address the root causes of our fragility […]. 
We began by focusing our effort on securing peace and stability – 
for there can be no development without security. We worked to 
heal wounds, to change mentalities and to address deep social 
problems […]. Timor-Leste has been fortunate to have the 
support of generous development partners […]. We now want to 
do what we can to make a contribution to other nations of the 
world in this same spirit of solidarity and friendship (Gusmão 
2011a).  
One of the clearest manifestations of this approach is the government’s 
co-sponsorship of the “g7+” initiative. As made clear on the group’s 
website as well as in the documents the members have produced, 
representatives of its member states use the language of the donor 
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community in such a way that illustrates their “desire for a reformed, 
recognizable ‘Other’, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, 
but not quite”, following Bhabha. For instance, the “g7+” homepage 
starts with one of the most widely cited accounts of global poverty in 
international policy guidelines, those produced by the World Bank and 
the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD: “Of the 7 billion 
people in the world, 1.5 billion live in situations of conflict and fragility” 
(g7plus.org 2013). It then describes the group as a “voluntary association” 
of “fragile” and “conflict-affected” states seeking to “stop conflict, build 
nations and eradicate poverty through innovative development strategies” 
(g7plus.org 2013). Timorese leaders’ “desire for a reformed, recognizable 
‘Other’” is also alluded to in the group’s objectives, which can be 
summarised thusly: to provide a forum through which to achieve the 
reform of both the current aid system and international engagement by 
considering fragility from the perspective of the developing rather than 
the developed (g7plus.org 2013). 
Another reflection of the “performative” function of the “failed 
state” paradigm in the context of Timorese politics is the rise of a 
political discourse that is marked by a predisposition to treat any 
implication of misconduct or criticism of the political leadership’s 
policies and practices, particularly in the field of the rule of law, as a 
product of a biased approach and inaccurate knowledge. In January 2011, 
for instance, the government rejected a draft of the UNDP’s Human 
Development Report, which criticised the political leadership for failing to 
effectively address youth unemployment and impunity (Murdoch 2011). 
Timorese leaders questioned the authors’ motives and rejected the report 
on the grounds that it was politically biased and contained information 
that was not referenced. The report was rewritten and finally released in 
early May that year. However, the coverage of an internal UN 
presentation by the media shortly afterwards set off another political 
row.4 The leaked document, citing some of Gusmão’s past actions (such 
as the creation of special funds in the 2011 budget and the release of a 
former militia member upon his verbal order in 2009), contained an 
opinion that the Prime Minister might consolidate power at the expense 
of the parliament and the judiciary. It was described by Ramos-Horta, 
president at the time, as an example of “pseudo-analysis” by UN 
bureaucrats who “do not speak the local language and hardly ever mingle 
with East Timorese” (Tempo Semanal 2011). 
4  The leaked document, entitled For Sustainable Democratic Governance in Timor-Leste, 
Retreat on 24 January 2011, is accessible via <http://temposemanaltimor.blog 
spot.com/2011/05/exklusif-internal-un-document-says.html> (22 May 2011). 
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Rather than utilising diplomatic avenues to address the issue, Gus-
mão brought the said UN document to public attention during a speech 
he held on 17 May 2011, whose main themes were state-building and 
nation-building (Gusmão 2011b). The Prime Minister stated that he was 
described in an internal UN document as “a big obstacle to the 
development of democracy in Timor-Leste”. Like Ramos-Horta had 
done, Gusmão questioned the knowledge and motives of the staff of 
UNMIT (the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) and 
accused them of wishing to see Timor-Leste in a prolonged crisis so that 
they could stay longer in the country instead of moving on to dangerous 
environments. Gusmão advised the UN mission’s international and local 
staff to pack up and “offer [their] services to improve Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and give support to democracy in Yemen, Syria and Libya”.  
It is important to note that this was not the first time that the 
Timorese leader openly levelled his criticisms against the UN and other 
members of the international community. A brief overview of the 
speeches he delivered as well as the online postings by Secretary of State 
for Defence Julio Tomas Pinto since 2009 evinces the rise of a 
sovereignty-focused discourse among Timorese (see, for example, 
Gusmão 2010, 2011; Tempo Semanal 2010; Pinto 2009, 2011). Gusmão’s 
above rhetoric illustrates how the meaning and social effects of national 
interests and crises are constructed in official state discourses (Weldes 
1996, 1999) as well as demonstrating the relevance of these constructs to 
the consolidation of state power and a (re)generation of a sense of 
“imagined community” (Anderson 1991). 
First, by reacting in such a way as described above to the opinion 
that he, himself, was “a big obstacle to the development of democracy in 
Timor-Leste”, Gusmão marginalises alternative accounts and their 
content, which include references to the executive’s interference in the 
judiciary and his weakening of oversight mechanisms. Second, the Prime 
Minister links resistant or dissident elements of his actions and policies 
in the domestic realm to the outside. This is apparent in his statement 
that “UNMIT also mentioned the Maternus Bere [militia leader released 
in 2009] case. Some Timorese also shouted, because people from other 
countries told them to shout.” Third, by way of invoking sovereign 
sensitivities, the Timorese leader not only distinguishes the identity of 
the state as a successfully functioning democracy but also disciplines the 
inside. This is exemplified by his defining “good” citizens as not simply 
those in possession of state ID cards or those who vote in elections, but 
those who “defend Timor-Leste’s sovereignty”. His emphasis on this 
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aspect of citizenship is also highlighted in his advice to the Timorese 
who worked for UNMIT:  
You do not need to show off; you do not need to grovel for other 
people’s money, because this is a sickness, which we call mental 
colonialism or intellectual colonialism […]. In our Constitution it 
says: Do not alienate our sovereignty, do not sell our sovereignty 
to other people (Gusmão 2011b).  
Fourth, to paraphrase Weldes, Gusmão creates a particular identity or 
subject position of the Timorese state within specific power relations and 
“interpellates” the audience into this identity. As the Prime Minister 
declares at the end of his speech, “We know what we want, and the state 
of Timor-Leste knows what its people want.” In his usage of “we”, 
“Timor-Leste” becomes the identity of his “self” and of those listening, 
generating a broader sense of belonging around the identity of the state 
reasserted:  
The state cannot give value to the undeserved opinions of one or 
two individuals. The state needs to remain firm, follow the road 
that it knows to be correct and good for the people […]. During 
the war, we had one principle: “Rely on your own strength”, 
meaning “Rely on your own capacity.” We kept in our mind 
another principle – “national unity through reconciliation”, mean-
ing, we only build unity when we make peace and live in peace 
(Gusmão 2011b). 
On a final note, the context in which Gusmão levelled his criticisms is of 
particular importance. By delivering a fiery speech at a conference 
attended by foreign diplomats and UN staff, the Timorese politician 
targeted a specific audience and sought to send a specific message. His 
message conveyed not only the political leadership’s growing discomfort 
with the continued presence of the UN and other international capacity-
development agencies since 1999, but also its confidence in its own 
ability to take full control of the country’s governmental and institutional 
affairs, in recognition of Timor-Leste’s identity as a sovereign state.  
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have tried to demonstrate the connections between 
Timor-Leste’s insecure identity and its leaders’ foreign policy preferences 
in the post-independence period. Using a constructivist theoretical 
framework and relevant empirical material derived from the speeches 
and writings of Timorese state officials as a collection of “representa-
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tional practices”, I sought to clarify what is on their “slate” during their 
external interactions in the context of nation-state-building. After all, the 
specific foreign policy decisions that state officials take as part of their 
effort to shape and consolidate the political and cultural character of 
their state and its place in the emerging global order do not occur in an 
ideational vacuum, nor are they simply shaped by a set of supposedly 
objective rules and behaviours conditioned by the strategic environment 
where they are operating. Rather, their preferences are the products of 
“intersubjective meanings” of “self” and “other” residing in both inter-
national and domestic social and political processes.  
Understood as such, it becomes clear that Timorese policy-makers’ 
choice of Southeast Asia as the strategic orientation of the fledging state 
was neither the “only choice” available nor merely a matter of material 
considerations. Instead, they view ASEAN membership as providing an 
important opportunity to establish and secure the boundaries of state 
identity, which is essentially a “precarious” entity. Although strategically 
positioning Timor-Leste in Southeast Asia, the government has also 
sought to distinguish the sovereign identity of the state from its two 
powerful neighbours, Australia and Indonesia, by referencing its Portug-
uese heritage.  
These spatial aspects of identity creation and consolidation are also 
intermingled with the temporal aspects of the nation-building process; 
along the same vein, the temporal dimensions of the process have been 
influenced by the country’s historical experiences. This situation is mir-
rored in the rise of a sovereignty-focused political discourse that empha-
sises the fledging nation’s capacity to govern itself and function as a 
developmental state. This discourse which demonstrates the leadership’s 
growing confidence is closely related to the country’s transitional experi-
ence from a former colony and internationally supervised “fragile” polity 
to a more stable country. It is, in other words, embedded in a process of 
identity construction that is underpinned by the understandings and 
meanings Timorese officials have attributed to the emerging global order 
and Timor-Leste’s place therein. 
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